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Executive Summary 
Past land clearance in the River Murray Dryland Corridor (or Corridor) in South Australia to 
enable dryland farming has resulted in the degradation of biodiversity, exacerbation of wind 
erosion and increased groundwater recharge which ultimately leads to increased influx of 
saline groundwater into the River Murray.  
The South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Integrated Natural Resource Management Board 
(INRMB or the Board) has committed to targets for revegetation as a way to address 
biodiversity degradation and wind erosion in the dryland areas, and to reduce the impact on 
river salinity. To date, the primary approach to achieving this goal has involved a devolved 
grant scheme and cost-sharing with landholders willing to undertake revegetation.  
The aim of this report is to investigate policy options to encourage cost effective large scale 
revegetation in the River Murray Corridor that increases biodiversity, wind erosion and 
salinity benefits in ways that are considered to be equitable by the community.  
Objectives 
The objectives of this study are to evaluate and discuss three broad policy options and how 
they might be applied to encouraging large scale revegetation in the Corridor, including: 
1.  Payments, especially with regard to tendering for revegetation contracts 
2.  Tradeable credit systems, especially with regard to salinity credits 
3.  Market barrier removal, especially with regard to developing a biomass industry 
Policy Design Challenges 
Past experience with similar issues suggests that there are four key policy challenges that 
would have to be taken into account in choosing among options and in designing any policy 
that is implemented. They are:  
•  Challenges arising from cost, administrative and political feasibility of changing policy 
influencing revegetation; 
•  Feasibility, efficacy, equity and cost of environmental performance monitoring, and 
developing policy that differentiates payment rates more finely than is currently the 
case among landholders based on spatial differences in impacts of actions to improve 
environmental outcomes;  
•  Acceptability of policies that involve uncertainty about effectiveness of actions at 
influencing environmental outcomes to governments; 
•  Limited willingness of landholders to supply environmentally beneficial revegetation 
options such as farm forestry that involve large upfront costs and many years until 
any payoff. 
Evaluation of tendering policy options 
•  Tendering is a payment approach that involves asking landholders to submit bids 
describing actions they are willing to undertake and the level of payment they would 
be willing to accept to undertake these actions. Bids are selected for funding based 
on environmental cost effectiveness. 
•  Tendering approaches have the advantage of requiring relatively little change from 
current policy. They are essentially a refinement of the current cost sharing payment 
approach. 
•  Past experience shows that tendering can reduce the cost to government of 
encouraging environmental protection outcomes by local landholders. CSIRO Land and Water    Page 4 
•  Tendering has the greatest potential to increase environmental benefit per cost 
sharing dollar where there is a good informational basis (data and benefits 
assessment methods) for comparing environmental benefit of bids. 
•  Established techniques and appropriate data for bid ranking and selection are 
available in the case of the Corridor as the result of extensive study that has already 
taken place. 
•  Conceptually, bids could be solicited from individual landholders, from collectives of 
landholders such as landcare groups or from larger institutional investors who might 
“bundle” packages of multiple offers to revegetate. 
•  Tendering approaches may be of limited value where highly targeted actions are 
desirable because the approach relies on voluntary action and this may be limited in 
targeted areas where actions are most environmentally effective. 
•  There is some emerging evidence that a cleverly designed tendering process that 
involves education about ecological value of cooperative action can improve 
ecological outcomes. 
Evaluation of the biomass industry development option 
•  A biomass energy plant in the Corridor may well be economically attractive as a 
private enterprise. Recent analysis (Ward and Trengove 2004) suggests that a plant 
producing both electricity and activated charcoal could make a commercial rate of 
return on investment (15%) whilst paying farmers to revegetate at rates that are 
competitive with returns to current landuses. 
•  For a biomass industry model to be successful, it may be necessary to address cash-
flow timing constraints that make perennial plantings unattractive to some 
landholders. One approach would be to offer contracts guaranteeing fixed annual 
payments to landholders for planting perennial woody species. 
Evaluation of payments based on salinity credits for revegetation 
•  Conceptually, government subsidisation of payments to farmers to undertake 
biomass, or native species planting may be justified in that this could represent a less 
expensive way for government to attain river salinity, biodiversity, and wind erosion 
benefits than alternative payment policy approaches.  
•  A well developed technical capacity to assess salinity impacts of revegetation and 
dollar benefits to downstream users already exists. 
•  The government could make payments for revegetation that reduce the costs of 
future salt loads to the river. 
•  There is some risk due to the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of 
revegetation in reducing salt loading over time.  
•  Risk management could involve setting an upper bound on payments for revegetation 
at some fraction of the estimated cost of salinity to downstream users (e.g. 50%).  
•  However, recent analysis of the economics suggests that on a per hectare basis the 
payment that would be justified as the result of salinity damages avoided would be 
small relative to what a commercial biomass enterprise could pay for biomass 
plantings. 
Where to from here?  
The information provided in this report, together with the evaluation of biomass energy plant 
economics by Ward and Tengove (2004), and forthcoming work by Bryan et al. (2005) 
should provide the SA Government a good basis to select one or more option outlined here CSIRO Land and Water    Page 5 
for further assessment and/or development. Designed appropriately one of the above 
options, or a combination of policy options has the potential to encourage large scale 
revegetation in the River Murray Dryland Corridor. CSIRO Land and Water    Page 6 
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1. Introduction 
This study is a qualitative evaluation of policy approaches to encourage revegetation in the 
River Murray Corridor (or Corridor) region in South Australia. For the purposes of this study 
the Corridor is defined as a strip of land delineated using a 15km buffer on each side of the 
1956 River Murray floodplain from the Victorian/NSW border to Tailem Bend in the south 
(Figure 1). The Corridor area has been subject to large scale land clearance and whilst 
significant areas are under irrigated agriculture, most of the cleared area is now used for 
dryland cropping and grazing. It is these dryland areas that are the focus of this study. As a 
result of this land clearance in an era before the resultant adverse consequences were 
understood, the area is subject to increased recharge which ultimately leads to increased 
influx of saline groundwater into the River Murray channel. Land clearance, encouraged by 
government in a past era has also degraded the biodiversity of the area and led to wind 
erosion problems in many parts.  
The South Australian Murray-Darling Basin Integrated Natural Resource Management Board 
(INRMB or the Board) has committed to targets for revegetation as a way to address 
problems with salinity, biodiversity and wind erosion in the Corridor. To date, the primary 
approach to achieving this goal has been a devolved grants scheme involving cost-sharing 
with landholders willing to undertake revegetation.  
This report was commissioned to investigate policy options to encourage large scale 
revegetation in the River Murray Corridor in ways that increase salinity, biodiversity and wind 
erosion benefits. The goal is to identify approaches that could be implemented in ways that 
likely to be cost effective and considered to be equitable by the community.  
The report is divided into four sections. Section two describes the range of instruments that 
can at least conceptually be applied to environmental issues in general terms and outlines 
briefly how each type of instrument could be specifically applied to revegetation in the River 
Corridor. Section three describes past experiences that are likely to be the most important 
challenges to cost effective, environmentally effective and equitable policy for revegetation. 
This section also describes how policy could be implemented to overcome key challenges 
that are likely given the complex historical, economic, ecological and social context of the 
River Murray Corridor. Section four summarises findings and concludes by recommending a 
range of policy options for further evaluation.  
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Figure 1 – Location of the River Murray Dryland Corridor study area. 
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2. Policy Options 
2.1.  A Typology of Policy Options 
There are a range of policy approaches that can be and have been used to encourage 
actions such as revegetation with potential to improve the environment. The typology used 
here begins with the differentiation that economists consider to be fundamental between 
what is referred to as “technology-based” or “command and control” and “incentive based 
policy” or “market based instruments” (MBI). Technology-based policies characteristically 




•  Technology standards (e.g. requiring cement lined effluent ponds for livestock farms); 
•  Practice requirements (e.g. buffer strips of certain width between field crops and 
streams); and  
•  Input limits (e.g. bans on distribution of some pesticides or limits on rates and 
numbers of applications of others). 
 
When referring to MBI, economists mean policies that provide some incentive to reduce 
environmental impact and provide some flexibility in choice of means to achieve prescribed 
goals. Economists (e.g. OECD, 1994, Stavins, 2000; Randall, 2003) often differentiate 
between three main varieties of MBI: 
 
•  Charges or payments on emissions, environmental performance or some proxy 
(inputs or practices correlated with environmental performance); 
 
•  Tradeable credit approaches involve establishment of requirements for credits to 
emit pollutants (or use inputs that are correlated with pollution), limit the number of 
credits available to each source, and allow sources to meet credit requirements by 
reducing emissions or by buying credits from other sources which create a surplus 
through emissions (or input) reductions.    
 
•  Market barrier removal approaches to create markets that can lead to improved 
environmental outcomes where such markets previously did not exist. It is useful to 
consider three distinct sub-categories: 
 
o  Commercial market development approaches involve efforts to facilitate 
producing things in environmentally friendly ways. Production labelling 
schemes are one of the most discussed variants and involve labelling 
products produced in a way that improves the environment so that those 
willing to pay a premium for claimed environmental improvements can (e.g. 
Mech, 2004). An alternative approach to commercial market development 
(sometimes called industrial development policy) involves government 
supporting development of industries with assistance such as infrastructure 
development, market research or tax concessions. While the approach has 
typically focussed on economic developmental goals. Industrial development 
policy could focus on development of industries that produce in ways that 
generate favourable environmental outcomes; 
 
                                                  
1 A fourth form of MBI discussed by some economists is subsidy removal (e.g. Bari, 2002). It is of little 
relevance here as there is very little subsidy for dryland farming in the Corridor. Certainly, if time could be 
reversed, subsidisation of clearing that took place in the past might be reconsidered. CSIRO Land and Water    Page 10 
o  Institutional barrier removal approaches involve changing rules governing 
resource use in ways that allow those with interest who were previously 
precluded to act in markets to improve environmental quality. An example 
would be recent reforms in water law in some western US states that now 
allow purchase of water to be set aside for environmental flow where 
previously only purchase of water for consumptive use was allowed (Landry, 
1998). 
 
o  Information, risk and capital barrier removal – Sometimes new technology 
or management that can improve the environment and save money are poorly 
understood by those who could implement them. Given uncertainty about 
outcomes and expensive effort required to improve certainty, risk adverse 
landholders with limited capital are hesitant to make such investments. 
Information, demonstration, financing, and innovation insurance policies can 
remove such barriers in some cases.        
 
2.2.  Policy Options for the River Murray Corridor 
Conceptually, at least, any of the MBI policy types outlined above could be applied to 
encourage revegetation in the River Murray Corridor.  A number of specific MBI options for 
the River Murray Corridor are outlined here in broad terms and elaborated on and further 
evaluated in the next section.     
 
2.2.1 Payments   
The current approach is a payment policy using the standard “devolved grant” cost sharing 
approach. Landholders receive payments at levels that are preset for agreed practices.  
Payment levels on a per hectare basis are differentiated across broad zones with higher 
rates in zones where on average greater environmental benefits are expected. Newer GIS 
analyses (Bryan et al, 2005) suggest that impact of similar actions vary considerably within 
zones. Thus there could be benefits to more finely differentiating payments. 
 
Tendering is an MBI alternative to the current payment policy that could improve program 
cost effectiveness. The basic idea is that those sources interested in taking action to reduce 
environmental impact submit bids describing actions they propose and compensation they 
would require. The agency soliciting bids then ranks bids based on cost per unit 
environmental benefit expected and offers to fund the most environmentally cost effective 
among potential offers.  
The approach has been widely applied to natural resource policy. Examples include the US 
Conservation Reserve Program (Smith, 2003) the Australian BushTender program 
(Stoneham et al., 2002), and Catchment Care programs (Bryan et al., 2004), the New 
Zealand East Coast Forestry Program (Hatton McDonald et al. 2004) and the Colorado River 
Salinity Program (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2001). Tendering typically involves use of 
models to develop some measure of expected environmental impact estimated with 
parameters characterising proposed actions and attributes of sites where actions are 
proposed.  
Economic theory suggests that tendering should be an attractive form of payment policy from 
a government perspective for two reasons: 
•  If properly structured, a tendering policy can provide sources with incentives to reveal 
something close to the minimum amount that they would require to provide actions. In 
contrast with the current devolved grant approach, all are funded at the same rate, CSIRO Land and Water    Page 11 
including those who would gladly offer the works for less. In addition, tendering could 
induce action from some who might only offer works with very high environmental 
benefits by accepting bids at rates higher than the current level in some cases.    
 
•  When underpinned with good biophysical modelling, tendering approaches offer an 
informational basis for prioritising bids based on environmental impact per dollar 
spent.  
 
Several ex-post evaluations of Australian tendering programs dealing with diffuse terrestrial 
biodiversity and water quality issues concluded that such approaches can be cost effective in 
comparison to uniformly set payments (Stoneham et al., 2002; Bryan et al., 2004). The 
operation and results of the Bush Tender program are explained in Box 1.  
 
Box 1: The Victorian BushTender Program 
BushTender is an incentive based approach to encouraging private land management 
practices that will protect and enhance remnant native vegetation. The program was first 
trialled at two pilot sites in Victoria in 2001 (DNRE, 2001). Participants, working with program 
officers, prepare plans describing actions they are willing to take to enhance biodiversity on 
their property. After preparing plans potential participants submit sealed bids stating the cost-
share payment they would be willing to accept to carry out the plans.  The DNRE then sort 
the bids on the basis of cost per unit of ecological value. The result is a bar graph of offers 
ordered by the incentive payment requested per unit of ecological value. The DNRE then 
accepts cost sharing offers in order of value of ecological benefits per cost-sharing dollar 
until the program budget is exhausted. 
Evaluation of the first year of program experience led to the conclusion that significant 
numbers of program participants offered to undertake high levels of on ground works for 
small incentive payments. It was estimated that about 25% more environmental benefit was 
achieved as the result of giving out $400,000 of incentive money through tendering than 
would have been achieved had cost sharing been offered at a set cost sharing rate  
(Stoneham et al.,  2002). 
 
In the past, most tendering approaches have involved soliciting offers form small individual 
landholders to change land management. Examples of this approach include BushTender 
(Stoneham, et al., 2002), the US Conservation Reserve Program (Smith, 2003), and 
Catchment Care (Bryan et al., 2004). In principle, tenders could also be solicited for large 
proposals involving collective action by multiple parties and/or offers to change land 
management practices over large areas as part of an investment that involves development 
of a woody perennial industry or some approach to capturing amenity values associated with 
revegetation (e.g. eco-tourism). For example, the South Australian government could solicit 
bids form large institutional investors or landholders collectives with evaluation of bids based 
on collective cross property environmental outcomes. This would be conceptually similar to 
the way the government currently solicits bids for large bundles of goods like computers or 
cars. The potential merits of such an approach are discussed in the evaluation of tendering 
policy approaches below. 
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2.2.2  Tradable Credits  
Under current MDBC salinity policy, the South Australian Government has obligations to 
offset any increases in salinity concentration in the River Murray above 2001 levels that 
originate in SA (MDBMC, 2002). This MDBC salinity accountability involves debits for all 
actions that increase river salinity and credits for all actions that decrease river salinity 
(relative to the 2001 baseline). As the protocols detailing implementation of this policy 
currently stand, credits that result from private actions such as revegetation that reduce 
salinity are granted to States not the individuals taking the actions. Consequently, current 
salinity policy implementation provides no incentive for private parties to take actions such as 
revegetation that decrease river salinity loading. 
 
Currently, South Australia meets its River Murray salinity obligations primarily through salt 
interception of saline groundwater. Economic opportunities for salt interception schemes are 
identified by comparison with known costs of salinity to downstream users in dollars per unit 
of Electrical Conductivity (EC) at various points along the River Murray. The opportunities for 
economic salt interception schemes are limited. An opportunity exists to reduce the cost to 
the South Australian Government of meeting its MDBC salinity obligations by modifying 
treatment of salinity credits for actions by landholders such as revegetation that reduces 
groundwater recharge and hence, river salinity.  
 
One approach could be along the lines of “opt-in” provisions in US SO
2 and point/diffuse 
source nutrient credit trade programs. In both programs some sources place caps on 
emissions: large coal fired electricity plants in the SO
2 case and large point sources of 
nutrients such as factories or water treatment plants in the nutrient credit trade case. Other 
smaller sources, for example farms in the nutrient credit trade case and smaller factories in 
the SO
2 case, face no caps on emissions. However, such sources can “opt in”. This involves 
voluntarily establishing a baseline level of emissions and receiving credits for reductions in 
emissions below their baseline that can be sold to those facing mandatory caps with demand 
for extra credits (Schary, 2003). The approach creates an incentive for “uncapped” sources 
to offer emission reductions when they can do so at lower cost than those facing mandatory 
emissions caps (Schary, 2003).        
 
Applied to revegetation and salinity in the Corridor, an “opt in” approach would allow States 
such as SA that require credits to meet their MDBC obligations to enter into agreements for 
provision of credits with landholders who can reduce salt load to the River through 
revegetation. The policy could be implemented so that revegetation efforts were only funded 
when they are expected to provide salinity credits for less than the cost of the equivalent 
salinity to downstream users. This is the same way that decisions to provide salt interception 
schemes are made.   
 
2.2.3  Market Barrier Removal 
Commercial market development may be an attractive approach to encouraging revegetation 
in the Corridor. The basic idea would be to offer some form of Government support to 
develop an industry that uses biomass from woody perennial plantings as an input, thereby 
increasing the demand for revegetation. An example is the Narrogin energy plant in Western 
Australia. The plant contracts local farms to establish trees and provides for their harvest. 
The trees are then used to produce both energy and activated charcoal. It is possible that a 
South Australian Government financial contribution to a commercial market development 
strategy could be justified even for an industry that was not profitable enough to attract 
unsubsidised private investment.  CSIRO Land and Water    Page 13 
 
In particular, this could be the case if development policy were viewed as an alternative to a 
payment policy and the Government contribution were less on per unit of river salinity load 
reduction, wind erosion control, biodiversity improvement basis than alternative payment 
policy options. Recent economic analysis summarised in Box 2 suggests that this option may 
be commercially viable. 
 
 
Box 2: The economics of biomass energy in River Murray 
 
The idea of a biomass enterprise would be to contract farmers to plant trees to fuel an 
energy plant.  An enterprise along these lines known as the Narrogin biomass energy 
scheme is currently being constructed in Western Australia and farmers have already been 
contracted to plant trees to fuel the plant.  The intent of the Narrogin scheme is to produce 
multiple outputs, not only energy but also activated charcoal and eucalyptus oil, as economic 
analysis suggested that the Narrogin plant may not be as profitable with energy as the sole 
product. 
Ward and Trengove (2004) have assessed the economics of developing a biomass energy 
enterprise in the River Murray Corridor.  One key conclusion of their analysis was that, as 
with the Narrogin plant in Western Australia, production of multiple outputs (energy plus 
activated charcoal) would be necessary for a biomass plant to be profitable in the Corridor.   
Another key conclusion was that the amount a plant could afford to pay landholders per 
hectare of biomass (net of production, harvest and transport costs) and still make a 
commercial return would vary by location of planting. This is because of location differences 
in productivity related to rainfall, transport and harvest costs. Payments that a plant could 
afford if 15% of annual return on investment were required were analysed for plantings in 
three part of the Corridor Zone 1 refers to the reach from the Victorian border to Lock 3. Zone 
2 refers to the reach from Lock 3 to Morgan and Zone 3 from Morgan to Wellington.  The 
highest level of payment per hectare is estimated in Zone 3 where a plant could pay 
approximately $45 per hectare per annum to landholders for planting biomass net of all costs 
and still make a 15% return on investment.   
In addition, biomass planting may have natural resource management benefits of reducing 
salinity loading in the River Murray and wind erosion. Ward and Trengove (2004) and Bryan 
et al. (2005) estimated the recharge control that would result in a scenario involving 14,000 
ha of revegetation distributed across zones scenario could reduce River salinity 
concentration by around 4 EC at Morgan within 100 years. Because most of the benefit occur 
several decades after planting the discounted value of benefit is very small on per hectare of 
biomass planted basis. Ward and Trengove (2004) and Bryan et al. (2005) conclude that 
given the low levels of estimated salinity reduction benefit, the costs of a salinity reduction 
payment policy design and implementation are likely to exceed the public benefits.  
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3. Policy Challenges and Design Answers 
The situation in the Corridor conforms to the class of environmental issues that involve 
environmental impacts from many diffuse sources. Four key challenges to successfully 
implementing cost effective, equitable policy for diffuse source environmental issues have 
been identified in the literature evaluating the issue. The challenges are:  
•  Property rights arrangements; 
•  Environmental performance monitoring and differentiation feasibility, efficacy and 
cost;  
•  Risk assignment with uncertainty about efficacy of control; 
•  Information, capital, management, time preference and behavioural/social constraints 
on the willingness to supply environmental action. 
 
These challenges are described in generic terms and their implications for Corridor 
revegetation policy are discussed in this section. In addition, details of policy design that 
might be effective at addressing key challenges to effective, efficient and equitable for River 
Corridor revegetation policy options outlined above are discussed.  
  
The discussion is premised on the assumption that what makes one policy approach more 
effective at addressing a particular challenge than another is not simply the type of 
instrument employed (e.g. tradeable permits, charges) but the detail of policy design. The 
discussion draws on analyses found in the literature that focuses on how one policy viewed 
as a bundle of design attributes might be more likely than another to overcome particular 
impediments  (Randall, 2003; Schary, 2003; Stavins, 2000; Connor et al, forthcoming). In this 
discussion, the policy choice problem is viewed as a matter of selecting from a menu of 
potential options and policy design features that are best suited to address the most relevant 
challenges in a given context. The goal is to consider how particular MBI options can be 
crafted to address the particular challenges identified for River Corridor revegetation. In 
discussing policy design features the following categories of policy design are considered: 
 
•  Policy basis – Options include charges, payments, credits based on environmental 
outcome, measured emissions, inputs, practices, observable attributes used to model 
outcome or emission. 
•  Differentiation – Options include charges, payments, credit requirements on a uniform 
basis for all sources, spatially differentiated, differentiated by price discriminating 
auction, temporally differentiated, differentiated based on input use, emissions or 
impact level (e.g. tiered pricing). 
•  Timing – Options include payment, charge or credit assignment at time of action, at 
time of impact, using bonding, or deposit refund approaches, alternative finance 
arrangements to address cash flow constraints, credit trade with or without banking 
and borrowing. 
•  Targeting – Options include policy treating all sources, policy treating only a limited 
number of large sources that cumulatively represent most of impact, choosing 
sources for treatment through price discriminating auction. 
•  Transaction requirements – Options include responsibilities for sources to investigate 
and monitor, or for agencies to investigate and monitor; charges, payments or credit 
requirements based on pre-authorised terms or on individual transaction monitoring 
and modelling.  CSIRO Land and Water    Page 15 
3.1.  Property Rights Arrangements 
3.1.1 Challenges 
One useful way to think about the challenge of devising cost effective environmental policy 
involves considering the policy as a social contract specifying benefits accruing to and 
obligation required of those granted access to a resource. Economist such as Bromley 
(1991) refer to contracts specifying bundles of rights and obligations as property rights. For 
example if you own residentially zoned land your property rights probably include obligations 
to pay council rates, a right to resell the property, and an obligation not to convert the land to 
commercial development.  
Often obligations related to environmental management are not specified or not enforced. 
So, for example, recharge rights are not completely specified in that there is no legislated 
obligation for landholders in the Corridor to achieve a particular level of recharge. 
The kinds of property rights that are or are not in place in a given setting can be a major 
determinant of what policy options are feasible. For example, the absence of obligations for 
polluters to limit emissions represents a fundamental impediment to tradeable credit policies 
(Randall, 1978). Similarly, lack of administrative apparatus for enforcement of obligations can 
limit the range of policy that can be implemented in some settings.  
Conceptually, property rights impediments to policy can be overcome by establishing 
additional property rights. For example, at least conceptually, a legal obligation not to exceed 
a set level of recharge per hectare could be legislated. However, specification of property 
rights in a way that would allow markets to function is not necessarily desirable when all 
costs associated with development and ongoing operation of alternative property rights 
arrangements are accounted for. A fundamental finding by Coase (1960) is that in some 
situations the costs of developing, administering, and enforcing property rights may exceed 
the value of efficiency gains possible with changed property rights arrangements. For 
example, given the challenges in actually measuring or estimating recharge, the cost of a 
monitoring, administration, and enforcement system to do so would very likely exceed the 
value of benefits that could be expected as a result. 
Another type of challenge to changing property rights arrangements even when this may be 
cost effective accounting for all cost and benefits to society (including costs of developing 
and implementing alternative property rights arrangements) might be referred to as an equity 
impediment or challenge. Such impediments have to do with the political feasibility of some 
property rights arrangements that involve increased cost for some parties even though the 
design is potentially more efficient for society as whole. So, for example, although it could be 
the case that shifting from a sharing policy that paid all landholders to revegetate to policy 
that involved charges based on estimated impact of recharge would be more cost effective 
for society as whole, it would involve a significant shift in responsibility and compliance costs 
and thus may not be politically feasible. 
3.1.2  Implications for Revegetation Policy in the Corridor 
Currently there are few legislated obligations requiring landholders in cleared areas of the 
river Corridor to limit recharge or to compensate those who are impacted as the result of 
Mallee clearance
2. Indeed, clearing land was a legislated requirement to gain land title at the 
time the land was settled. Many landholders in the area recognise the adverse 
consequences that land clearing has had and certainly strive to farm in ways that ameliorate 
adverse impacts of land clearing that took place in a past era. None-the-less, the lack of 
legislated obligations means that tradeable credit and environmental charge policies would 
                                                  
2 In contrast, holders of land that supports native vegetation have clearly defined and enforced obligations not to 
clear under the Native Vegetation Act, 1991.  CSIRO Land and Water    Page 16 
not be feasible in the study area unless property rights defining such obligations were 
developed as legally enforceable obligations. Considering that much of the impact of clearing 
is the result of decisions taken in the distant past, it also seems likely that charges or 
obligations to reduce recharge that involved significant compliance costs for landholders 
would be politically infeasible.  
Payment approaches are generally feasible within current property rights constructs and in 
fact represent the status quo policy. There may well be ways to re-organise the design 
features of the current payment approach to increase cost effectiveness, for example by 
changing to a tendering system, as discussed in the last section.  
The option of re-arranging how the Government of South Australia deals with meeting its 
MDBC salinity impact mitigation responsibilities discussed in the last section would also 
require some re-arrangement of property rights. As already discussed, under current MDBC 
protocols, salinity debits and credits resulting from private commercial actions such as 
revegetation are attributed to States (MDBC, 2003). Thus while there are some non-financial 
incentives (e.g. community recognition, environmental ethics) there are few financial 
incentives for landholders to contribute to the solution, even if they can do so at low cost. The 
potential for an “opt-in” approach was described in the last section. The approach is likely to 
be considerably less challenging from a political feasibility perspective than approaches 
requiring development of mandatory obligations to reduce recharge. In essence, the “opt-in” 
approach is a “self selection” targeting strategy that allows those who can most cost 
effectively contribute to select themselves as program participants.  One important 
advantage of this type of targeting is that developing credit/debit registers, performance 
auditing would only be necessary for a perhaps relatively small number of landholders who 
would “opt-in” and the considerable expense involved in such effort could be avoided for the 
potentially large number of landholders who might not participate.   
 
3.2.  Monitoring and Differentiation 
3.2.1 Challenges 
Actual environmental performance can often be measured for point source environmental 
issues. For example, levels of air or water pollution emitted from a factory pipe can often be 
directly monitored at reasonable cost with available technology. In contrast, monitoring the 
actual environmental outcome of interest is often a challenge with diffuse source 
environmental issues. A result has been that many diffuse source environmental issue 
policies have focused on a narrowly described set of practices or inputs. This has precluded 
the kinds of savings from response flexibility that have made point source MBI, that were 
focussed on actual performance, so cost effective (Randall, 2003; Schary, 2003). 
The only real alternative to basing policy on actual environmental outcome in many cases is 
to base policy on inputs or practice that can be readily observed (e.g. level of revegetation 
and perhaps quality of revegetation in the river Corridor case). However, to realise cost 
savings with MBI approaches in settings where actual outcome monitoring is not possible, 
someway to account for differences in the way similar input levels can lead to very different 
impacts is necessary. Economists have long understood that where impact of an identical 
amount of input or practice varies spatially, as is often the case with environmental quality 
issues, uniform charges, payments or credit requirements based on input or practice will not 
be cost effective (Tietenberg, 1978). The reason is that if resources are spent to reduce input 
where little environmental impact results, more impact could have resulted if the same level 
of resources had been spent at locations where greater impact would have resulted from the 
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Early proposals in the economics literature suggested individually differentiating credit 
requirements, charge or payment rates to reflect differences in impact per unit of action 
(Tietenberg, 1978, Rose-Ackerman, 1973).  A challenge arises because individual 
differentiation may be politically infeasible and policy involving complex differentiation based 
on individual case modelling may introduce very high transactions costs (Baumol and Oates, 
1988). The result is that there are tradeoffs between potential cost-effectiveness gains from 
policies that allow more perfect differentiation and resultant transaction costs
3. Potentially, 
there may also be equity issues related to differentiation, in that some kinds of differentiation 
may be considered inequitable. 
One way to capture some of the advantages of a policy based on actual performance when 
performance cannot actually be measured, without the high transaction costs of site specific 
data gathering and modelling for each transaction, is zone based charge, payment or credit 
requirement differentiation. Tietenberg (1978) was an early proponent of this approach. The 
Nyah to the South Australian Border Salinity Management Strategy is a good example of a 
policy for a diffuse source environmental issue using this approach. As explained in Box 3, 
charge rates for salinity impact in this scheme are on based on water use with different rates 
in each of four zones based on estimated differences in zone average salinity load impact of 
drainage. 
                                                  
3 For example, the U.S. SO
2 credits program has provision for credit trade both within and among bubbles. 
Bubbles are local areas where impact per unit emissions from all sources has roughly equal environmental 
impact. However, trade outside of bubbles requires modelling of impact for approval and to set terms of trades. 
Stavins (2001) suggests that costs associated with assessing impacts of trades outside of bubbles might be an 
explanation of why very few trades out of bubbles took place. CSIRO Land and Water    Page 18 
Box 3 - Zone based charges for irrigation salinity impacts in Victoria 
 
The Nyah to the South Australian Border Salinity Management Plan has been in place in the 
Victorian Sunraysia Irrigation Trust since 1993 (Sunraysia Rural Water Authority 2002). The 
policy involves a levy for irrigation development proportional to the salinity impact that the 
irrigation causes. Proceeds finance salt interception. The area under the plan has been 
classified into five zones, as shown below based on hydrogeology modelling of salinity 
impacts of irrigation.  
 
 
The grey shaded area denoted HIZ in the figure above is designated high impact zone. No 
new irrigation development is allowed in this area because, in the judgement of plan 
administrators, salinity impacts of irrigation in this area are so high that they would result in 
very rapid depletion of the limited supply of salinity mitigation capacity in the region.  
 
In the four low impact zones (L1-L4), irrigation development is allowed. However, in addition 
to other conditions, salinity charges are levied. The charges are proportional to modelled 
average salinity impact of irrigation in each zone as shown below. The levy can be paid on a 
once off basis or as ten annual payments. 
 
 
3.2.2  Implications for Revegetation Policy in the Corridor 
Ultimately, the outcomes of interest in the River Murray Corridor are not revegetation per se, 
but rather reductions in salinity, and wind erosion and enhancement of biodiversity. Clearly, it 
would be difficult to implement policy on the basis of these outcomes because they would be 
difficult to monitor. There are large time delays (decades) between action (revegetation) and 
impact (reduced salt load, increased biodiversity) and the process of salinity loading takes 
place below the surface of the land where it cannot be directly observed.  
Conceptually, zone based payment differentiation with higher rates where benefits are 
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levels to encourage revegetation in the River Corridor. As discussed above tendering is one 
way to structure a payment policy to capture benefits of differentiation.  
Clearly, an important prerequisite to using modelled impacts as a policy base for approaches 
such as tendering or to a lesser extent zone based payment for charge differentiation is good 
data availability for relevant parameters and a good understanding of and capacity to model 
relevant environmental processes. When such capacity does not exist, there is need to 
carefully consider how the costs of developing such capacity compare to the benefits of 
policies that can be implemented with such information. Fortunately, in the case of the River 
Murray Corridor, considerable investment has already been made that provides a good basis 
for prioritisation of actions based on scientific information about both salinity and biodiversity 
benefits. More detailed description of this capacity and how it can be used in prioritisation will 
be forthcoming in the Stage 2 project report. 
 
3.3.  Risk Assignment with Uncertainty about Efficacy of Control 
3.3.1 Challenges 
As explained in the property rights discussion above, environmental policy can be viewed as 
a contract between those with access to a resource and society as whole that defines a 
bundle of obligations and rights associated with use of the resource. The goal of most 
environmental policy is to achieve some state of the environment (e.g. river salinity below a 
certain concentration). However, there is nearly always some uncertainty regarding what the 
actual contribution of specific actions toward meeting the goal are likely to be. All 
environmental policy assigns responsibility to deal with consequences of outcome 
uncertainty.  
Often the responsibility to deal with consequences of uncertainty is implicitly assigned to 
society (rather than individuals with access to resources). The current cost sharing approach 
to encouraging revegetation in the Corridor is an example of a property rights arrangement 
assigning consequences of uncertainty to society. Payment is given for action (e.g. 
revegetation) rather than performance (e.g. salinity load avoided). There are no 
contingencies for withholding part of payment if revegetation establishment is unsuccessful 
or avoided salinity impact turns out to be less than anticipated when understanding of 
environmental processes is improved.   
Some environmental policy assigns responsibility to deal with consequences of uncertainty to 
parties using resources in ways that impact the environment. A good example is the MDBC 
salinity agreements between the States along the River Murray. Under this agreement, 
states are responsible for taking actions necessary to mitigate any increases in river salinity 
above defined baseline levels. Several provisions assign responsibility for risks related to 
outcome uncertainty of mitigation actions. One provision is that credits are only granted to 
State governments for actions once they are proven to be operating effectively. Other 
provisions allow for States debit positions to be updated in some instances based on 
improvements in the scientific basis for estimating impacts (MDBC, 2003).  
Clearly, applying more complex contingencies such as those in the MDBC salinity 
agreements to landholders would reduce risks to society resulting from uncertainty regarding 
outcomes of actions. However, developing and implementing the necessary property rights 
arrangements would result in greater administrative, monitoring, negotiation, and 
enforcement effort than less complex property rights arrangements, such as simple contracts 
to take specified actions, that implicitly assign risk to society.   
Ultimately, treatment of risk involves tradeoffs between the governments’ willingness to bear 
risk, and the costs of measures to deal with risk such as administering property rights 
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would be unlikely to be cost effective when dealing with many small diffuse sources for an 
environmental externality. This is because the level of costs associated with administering, 
monitoring, and negotiating complex agreements would tend to be very large compared to 
benefits for contracts with many small sources as opposed to a few large sources.  
An approach known as “trading ratios” has been used in many U.S. point source / diffuse 
source nutrient credit trade policies as a way to lower Government risk without increasing 
costs of administering, monitoring, negotiating contracts (Schary, 2003). The basic idea is 
that point sources with mandatory requirements to meet set emissions levels or attain credits 
from other sources through trade, can enter into agreements with diffuse sources. Diffuse 
sources can supply credits by implementing agreed practices to reduce nutrient loading. To 
account for the greater uncertainty associated with diffuse sources, source credits can only 
be used to offset point source debits at a trading ratio. Typically trading ratios are 2:1 or 3:1, 
meaning that twice or three times the estimated diffuse source load reduction is required per 
unit point source reduction. A conceptually similar approach could also be applied to 
payment policy (e.g. half the payment per unit estimated environmental improvement for 
more uncertain actions). The essence of the concept has also been applied to tendering. In 
the Colorado River Salinity Program (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 2001) bids for actions to 
reduce river salinity loading with greater outcome uncertainty are rated less highly (all other 
things equal) than bids for actions with less outcome uncertainty.   
3.3.2  Implications for Revegetation Policy in the Corridor 
One of the challenges the INRMB faces with the current cost sharing approach arises 
because payments are on action (e.g. hectares planted). This means that the incentive is to 
plant but there is not necessarily any incentive to maintain planting in ways that minimise 
recharge. However, recharge reduction performance depends not only on what is planted 
(e.g. perennial pasture) but also on how well it is maintained (e.g. percentage of area cover 
successfully established after 1, 2, 3, 4 years). Currently any risk that revegetation is not as 
successful as anticipated is borne by the INRMB with no further payments in future years 
related to success at maintaining the effectiveness of plantings at reducing recharge.  
An alternative treatment of this kind of risk that might be considered for the Corridor is under 
development and to be trialled shortly through a commonwealth MBI trial dealing with 
revegetation in the Loddon Catchment in Victoria (Ward and Connor, 2004). The idea is to 
partially shift risk to landholders in a way that rewards management that increases recharge 
reduction effectiveness by making part of payment proportional to cover measured at set 
times in years after establishment.       
Risk assignment will also be important in considering any policy to create incentive for 
revegetation through changes in the way MDBC salinity credits are treated. As outlined 
above, under the MDBC salinity agreement between States, the South Australian 
Government is responsible for meeting targets of no increase in contribution to River Murray 
salinity above baseline levels from actions in the South Australia. At the present the SA 
Government primarily meets its obligations through investments in salt interception/drainage 
disposal. Evaluation by Connor, Cook and Miles (2003), suggest that there may be some 
cleared dryland farming areas in the Corridor where reductions in salt load through 
revegetation might be less costly than investment in salt interception as a way to meet SA 
MDBC salinity targets.  
However, from the perspective of the SA Government, credits from revegetation involve 
greater uncertainty than credits from salt interception. Salt interception can be installed when 
salt load is already hitting the River and, based on past experience, there is good reason to 
expect that it will function to effectively remove most of the salt in short time (a year or two 
after salt interception plant installation). The result is that the SA government can be 
reasonably certain about the level and timing of salinity credits it can expect if it invests in 
salt interception now. In contrast, if the SA Government invested in revegetation (or contracts CSIRO Land and Water    Page 21 
landholders to) the timing and magnitude of salinity credits that it could expect as result 
would be subject to considerable uncertainty.  
Studies (e.g. GHD, 1999) have quantified the cost of salinity in the River Murray to 
downstream users. These estimates are used to identify cost effective salt interception 
opportunities. Basically, if the cost of salt interception is lower (by a multiplier) than the cost 
of the equivalent salinity impacts on downstream users then the scheme is considered 
economical. However, the interception of saline groundwater intrusion onto the River Murray 
is most effective in particular locations along the river with the right geological and 
hydrological conditions. As salt interception schemes expand, opportunities for economic salt 
interception become fewer.  
Any policy to encourage revegetation as a less costly way for the South Australian 
Government to meet its MDBC salinity target would require a way of treating uncertainty that 
is acceptable to the Government of South Australia. One administratively low cost way to 
treat the uncertainty issue would involve setting an upper bound on Government willingness 
to pay for revegetation based on the cost of salinity impacts to downstream users. In 
recognition that revegetation in an investment with uncertainty surrounding the impact on 
salinity reductions, the government could use something similar to a trading ratio approach. 
For example this could involve setting an upper bound on payments for revegetation at say 
50% of the cost of salinity impacts to downstream users (or some other fraction).     
3.4.  Information, Capital, Management, Time Preference and 
Behavioural/Social Constraints on the Supply Side  
3.4.1 Challenges 
The simplest models of economic behaviour are premised on the assumption that if an 
alternative to current land management practices exist that is profitable, landholders will 
adopt it. In reality, there are a range of reasons why potentially profitable alternatives are 
sometimes not widely adopted. Two related constraints are: financial capital availability and 
time preference constraints. These can be most easily understood by considering perennial 
revegetation options (e.g. tree crops) that require significant investment “up-front” for returns 
expected many years in the future.  Financial capital availability is one factor that can 
constrain capacity of some landholders to make such investments. The point is that there are 
some landholders who do not have the upfront capital requirement and cannot qualify to 
borrow it regardless of how profitable the investment might be. Time preferences for money 
is another factor that can sometimes limit adoption of land management options with long 
time delay until payoff. The constraint arises because some landholders facing needs to 
achieve economic returns on an annual basis to meet household needs prefer less profitable 
land uses that payoff sooner to more profitable investments with longer times until payoff. 
Information represents another often significant constraint to landholder willingness to 
change management. While more profitable options than current practice may exist that are 
understood by those with specialised knowledge, this may not be understood my most 
landholders without specialised knowledge. Information can constrain the amount of adoption 
in two ways.  Often understanding how to cost effectively adopt a new land management 
approach requires investment in information. A related informational impediment to adoption 
of new practices arises when a lack of understanding of how to implement new practices, 
increases return risk (or even just perceived risk). The cost of such information constraints 
must obviously be factored into their cost-benefit calculus and implies less supply of the land 
management practice than would be anticipated in the absence of information costs.        
In general, capital, and information constraints tend to be more significant for smaller 
enterprises than for larger enterprises with capital investment budgets and the economies of 
scale necessary to justify investment in specialists with capacity to accurately assess 
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This constraint can sometimes be overcome where there are contractors who specialise in 
consulting small enterprises on how to change practice in ways that can reduce costs and 
risk. Specialist farm management consultants represent an example. In some cases, large 
entities will enter into agreements with smaller enterprise in ways that overcome small 
enterprise capital, time preference and information constraints. Forestry firms that enter into 
contract with farmers to plant trees are an example. These contracts typically guarantee 
farmers fixed annual payments on terms that forestry firms expect to be profitable. The 
forestry firms are willing to provide upfront capital and accept that payoff will only be realised 
at harvest. 
3.4.2  Implications for Revegetation Policy in the Corridor 
Available data on size of landholding in the river Corridor suggests a skewed distribution with 
a large number of small landholding and a few large ones. Information, capital and time 
preference constraints would likely be particularly significant for tendering applied to 
individual land holders. The Government could overcome this constraint by itself offering 
contracts along the lines that forestry firms do with evenly spread annual payments. 
However, both the options of tenders from larger institutions and biomass industry support 
could be more attractive to the Government because both approaches could be structured to 
require less capital and lower risk to the Government. This would be the case if support for a 
private entity to undertake either approach was contingent on some willingness to provide 
capital and accept time delayed returns.    
4. Summary and Conclusions 
This report evaluated four policy options to induce large scale revegetation in the River 
Murray Corridor in ways that increase salinity, biodiversity and wind erosion benefits, are 
cost effective and are considered to be equitable by the community: 
•  Landholder tendering involves landholders submitting bids describing type and 
location of revegetation they would be willing to provide and compensation they 
would require to provide it. Bids are then prioritised based on total environmental 
value per dollar. 
•  While in the past most tendering programs have focused on individual, often small 
landholders. It would be possible to implement investor tendering where bids could 
potentially involve a broad range of arrangements such as subcontracting with 
landholders, revolving funds used to buy, improve and resell property with covenants 
to protect environmental improvement investments, or in other investments involving 
revegetation. Bids again would be evaluated based on salinity and biodiversity, and 
wind erosion benefits and those offering best environmental value for money.  
•  A carefully structured policy to offset landholder costs of revegetation through 
payments that could allow SA to cost effectively meet its MDBC salinity targets. 
•  Policies to encourage development of biomass industries that use biomass from 
woody perennial plantings as an input, thereby increasing the demand for 
revegetation. Even if the approach were not quite profitable enough to attract 
unsubsidised private investment, it could be justified if it represented a less expensive 
way to attain river salinity, biodiversity, wind erosion benefits than alternative payment 
policy approaches.  
 
Four key areas of challenge in implementing a policy were identified:  
•  The challenges that arise as the result of cost, administrative and political feasibility of 
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•  Challenges in developing feasible, effective and low cost environmental performance 
monitoring and differentiation;  
•  Challenges in finding ways to implement cost saving policy with acceptable risk to 
government and landholder given the uncertainty about cost and environmental 
effectiveness of revegetation; 
•  Limitations on the willingness of landholders to supply environmentally beneficial 
revegetation arising from information, capital, management, time preference and 
behavioural/social constraints. 
 
4.1.  Evaluation of Tendering Policy Options 
Tendering approaches applied to either individual landholders or larger investors have the 
advantage of requiring little institutional change. In essence they are payment approaches 
just as the current policy is. The difference is the criteria by which funds are allocated - offers 
are prioritised based on environmental cost effectiveness.  
Past experience shows that tendering can be cost effective. If properly structured the 
approach creates incentives for landholders to reveal something close to the minimum 
amount that they would require to provide actions. In contrast with the current devolved grant 
approach, all are funded at the same rate across broad zones. It is possible that within zones 
where current payments are equal some would gladly offer the works for less. In addition, 
tendering could induce action from some who might only offer works with very high 
environmental benefits by accepting bids at rates higher than the current level. 
A key prerequisite to realising cost savings with tendering is good biophysical data and 
modelling as an informational basis for differentiating and prioritising bids. Fortunately, in the 
case of the River Murray Corridor, considerable investment has already been made that 
provides a good basis for prioritisation of actions based on scientific information about both 
salinity and biodiversity benefits. 
Capital, time preference and information constraints would likely be more significant for a 
tendering policy focussed on individual smaller enterprises rather than larger institutional 
investors. This is because larger institutions are more likely to have capital investment 
budgets and the economies of scale necessary to justify investment in specialists with 
capacity to accurately assess alternative management options.  
If the Government were to consider tendering at an individual landholder scale it might be 
possible to overcome capital and information constraints by offering contracts along the lines 
that forestry firms do with evenly spread annual payments. Alternatively, Government could 
tender for offers from larger institutions with bid selection based on criteria favouring 
approaches that offer landholders evenly spread payment to overcome capital and 
information constraints. This might be more attractive to the Government than managing 
such arrangement on its own as it would require less capital and also “outsource” specialised 
expertise in developing appropriate finance arrangements. 
Another advantage of tendering directed at larger investors is that this approach could 
involve criteria for selecting bids that provide cross property environmental benefits such as 
wildlife Corridor connectivity. It may also encourage revegetation actions that are only 
profitable if implemented on large scales such as tree plantings to fuel a biomass energy 
plant.  
Tendering approaches may be of limited value where highly targeted actions are desirable 
because the approach relies on voluntary action and this may be limited in targeted areas 
where actions are most environmentally effective. 
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4.2.  Evaluation of the Biomass Industry Development Option 
Recent evaluation by Ward and Tengove (2004) suggests that establishing a Biomass 
energy plant in the Corridor could offer close to but not quite adequate returns to be viable as 
a purely private investment. Preliminary evaluation suggests that South Australian 
Government financial contribution sufficient to make a biomass energy plant privately 
profitable may be justified in that it could  represent a less expensive way to attain river 
salinity, biodiversity, wind erosion benefits than alternative payment policy approaches.  
For a biomass industry model to be successful, cash flow timing constraints that make 
perennial plantings unattractive to landholders would have to be addressed. Contracts of the 
type that forestry firms typically offer guaranteeing fixed annual payments could be a 
solution. This would require provision of upfront capital by either the SA government or a 
private contractor running a biomass energy plant and acceptance by the party(ies) providing 
the finance that payoff will only be realised once harvest and plant operation begins. 
 
4.3.  Evaluation of Payments Based on Salinity Credits for Revegetation 
Revegetation in the Corridor can reduce salt loading to the River. Conceptually this can 
reduce the need for the South Australian Government to invest in salt interception as a way 
to meet MDBC salinity targets. The South Australian government currently contracts with a 
private contractor (SA Water) to provide salt interception as a way to meet State MDBC 
salinity targets. In principle, SA could also enter into agreements with landholders or other 
contractors to provide revegetation as a way to meet salinity targets.  
Using the well developed technical capacity available to it to assess the cost of salinity 
impacts, the Government could set rates they would be willing to pay for revegetation so that 
revegetation could cost effectively contribute toward meeting MDBC salinity targets. 
Payments for salinity credits may be made based on the cost of salinity to downstream 
users.  
A challenge arises with this option in dealing with risk because certainty about the 
effectiveness of revegetation at reducing salt loading is low. One administratively low cost 
way to treat the uncertainty issue could involve setting an upper bound on payments for 
revegetation at some fraction (trading ratio) of estimated cost of salinity to downstream users 
(e.g. 50%).  
 
4.4.  Where to from here? 
The information provided in this report, together with the evaluation of biomass energy plant 
economics by Ward and Trengove (2004), and the Stage 2 report by Bryan et al. (2005) 
should provide the SA Government a good basis to select one or more option outlined here 
for further assessment and/or development. Designed appropriately one of the above 
options, or a combination of policy options may have the potential to encourage large scale 
revegetation in the River Murray Dryland Corridor. 
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